This is a revealing and frustrating book about the internal German resistance to Hitler throughout the 12 years of the Third Reich. ...

One didn't dare to inhale for fear of breathing it in. It was the sound of eighteen hundred airplanes approaching Hamburg from the south at an unimaginable height. We had already experienced two hundred or even more air raids, among them some very heavy ones, but this was something completely new. And yet there was an immediate recognition: this was what everyone had been waiting for, what had hung for months like a shadow over everything we did, making us weary. It was the end.

Jonathan Fenby is really on top form with this rivetting account of the relationships between the three great men, with a revealing cameo appearance from de Gaulle. His attempt to use personal diaries, correspondence and eye winess accounts verbatim, in order to paint a vivid picture of the key decision making during the second half of World War II, works superbly. The result is a fascinating and entertaining book which is hard to put down and which sometimes "transports" you to the summit chamber as a witness to this extraordinary period of modern history.

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on counterinsurgency; analyzes counterinsurgency operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about counterinsurgency, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future counterinsurgency operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct counterinsurgency in the future. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate.

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.