Jonathan Fenby is really on top form with this rivetting account of the relationships between the three great men, with a revealing cameo appearance from de Gaulle. His attempt to use personal diaries, correspondence and eye winess accounts verbatim, in order to paint a vivid picture of the key decision making during the second half of World War II, works superbly. The result is a fascinating and entertaining book which is hard to put down and which sometimes "transports" you to the summit chamber as a witness to this extraordinary period of modern history.

Jonathan Fenby is really on top form with this rivetting account of the relationships between the three great men, with a revealing cameo appearance from de Gaulle. His attempt to use personal diaries, correspondence and eye winess accounts verbatim, in order to paint a vivid picture of the key decision making during the second half of World War II, works superbly. The result is a fascinating and entertaining book which is hard to put down and which sometimes "transports" you to the summit chamber as a witness to this extraordinary period of modern history.

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on counterinsurgency; analyzes counterinsurgency operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about counterinsurgency, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future counterinsurgency operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct counterinsurgency in the future. For example, U.S. counterinsurgency experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate.

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Between January and July 1919, after “the war to end all wars,” men and women from around the world converged on Paris to shape the peace. Center stage, for the first time in history, was an American president, Woodrow Wilson, who with his Fourteen Points seemed to promise to so many people the fulfillment of their dreams. Stern, intransigent, impatient when it came to security concerns and wildly idealistic in his dream of a League of Nations that would resolve all future conflict peacefully, Wilson is only one of the larger-than-life characters who fill the pages of this extraordinary book. David Lloyd George, the gregarious and wily British prime minister, brought Winston Churchill and John Maynard Keynes. Lawrence of Arabia joined the Arab delegation. Ho Chi Minh, a kitchen assistant at the Ritz, submitted a petition for an independent Vietnam.